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Introduction 
The tragedy of September 11 and the US 
response in the form of the global war against 
terrorism (conceptually problematic as it is) 
have set in motion some real shifts in regional 
power balances but much greater alterations 
in perceptions of the nature and applicability 
of power in the globalized world. The basic 
level of uncertainty about the mid-term out-
look of the system of international relations 
has increased dramatically. The middle-of-the-
road scenarios have lost much value, while 
risk analysis has seen a surge in demand from 
political decision-making. There is obviously 
a greater need to look into the risks that had 
been dismissed as negligible in their proba-
bility even if grave in scale - and to plan for 
counter-measures. While the menu of such 
risks is quite rich, one of their greatest sources 
for the European security system continues 
to be Russia. 
President Putin has found in the on-going 
global confusion an opportunity to move 
Russia a great deal closer to the \Vest, his 
control over the structures of power across 
the enormous space of this country appears 
firm and his popularity remains astonishingly 
high. On the background of all the crises and 
recession in the world, Russia appears to be 
both politically stable and economically dyna-
mic, to much surprise and joy of its own 
population.' This picture, however, may be 
deceptive, and not only because another eco-
nomic crisis could hit Russia in the near future 
(autumn 2003 is a common point of reference) 
but primarily because many long-term factors 
of instability may doom Putin's state-building 
project to a failure. Russia is often described 
as a country with an unpredictable past, as 
well as one that cannot be understood with a 
common sense; the evidence for both asser-
tions is the fact that it can never arrive at any 
certainty about its identity and "mission". 
Putin's recipe of "pragmatic patriotism" may 
prove to be only a palliative measure with 
limited mobilizational effect and his new "go-
West" course could contribute to its fast ex-
piring.' 
While it is always too easy to be pessimistic 
about Russia's future, now it is also necessary 
to attempt to measure the scale of possible 
disasters in medium-long perspective, which 
is the case with this study. 3 On the one hand, 
dealing with Russia you cannot be that far 
off-target taking a catastrophic scenario as 
the basic one. Alexander Pushkin, writing in 
the 1830s about "the Russian bunt (revolt), 
senseless and merciless", was perhaps looking 
not that much 60 years back at the Pugachev 
uprising as 85 years ahead at the Civil War. 
On the other hand, the relatively peaceful col-
lapse of the USSR and the relatively stable 
(even if self-destructive) first decade of post-
Soviet life were indeed a chain of miracles, 
the famous Russian chudo,' and it would be 
a stretch to expect that it would continue for 
15 more years. 
This study is neither an attempt to warn 
about a looming catastrophe, nor an exercise 
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in "rationalising of chaos", aimed at develop-
ing a post-deterrence version of "thinking 
about the unthinkable" .5 It looks into a fairly 
disastrous scenario of erosion of the centra-
lized political structures by centrifugal forces, 
which - unfortunately - remains entirely 
possible and therefore needs being spelled out. 
While the risk associated with a self-fulfilling 
prophecy is dismissed by this author as negli-
gible, the limitations of focussing on just one 
narrow segment of a spectrum are fully recog-
nized. There will be many cross-roads ahead 
where Russia could suddenly slip down this 
slope, so the aim is to identify certain crucial 
points where a concentrated internal effort 
and/or determined external engagement (inter-
vention) could make a positive difference. The 
paper starts with marking the road that might 
lead to a series of complex and violent inter-
nal conflicts between 2010 and 2015, then 
examines the possible elements and parame-
ters of these conflicts, then takes a closer look 
at several theatres and flash-points, and final-
ly comes to the requirements for possible 
external (Western) interventions. 
A Road to the Abyss 
Several times during the 1990s Russia came 
to the brink of a violent implosion: starting 
with the abortive putsch of August 1991; 
followed by the confrontation between Pre-
sident Yeltsin and the Parliament in October 
1993, which escalated to a street riot sup-
pressed by tanks;' and finally the financial 
meltdown of August 1998 that threatened to 
evolve into a political collapse.' At the same 
time, it should be noted that neither the first 
nor the second Chechen Wars, with all their 
humiliating defeats and destructive intensity, 
produced a significant resonance across the 
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Federation or even a serious spill-over into 
the neighbouring regions. 8 The second war 
was, in fact, used as the launching pad for 
the project of consolidation and reinvigoration 
of the Russian state that has become a perso-
nal crusade of Russia's second president, 
Vladimir Putin. 
After two years of implementation of this 
project, Putin can claim credit for significant 
achievements. Regional governors and repub-
lican presidents dare not disobey his orders, 
the compliant parliament is ready to rubber-
stamp those, the "oligarchs" are either tamed, 
or crushed (primarily those with media em-
pires). Even the war in Chechnya, which stub-
bornly refuses to go away while its political 
usefulness has long since expired, is "virtually" 
reduced by the means of media control to a 
habitual and minor local problem.' At the 
same time, doubts in the sustainability of 
these successes persist. 10 
The problem is not that Putin has shown 
signs of hesitation and weakness (for instance, 
in restructuring the all-powerful natural mono-
polies like GAZPROM or RAO EEC). The 
real problem is that his project may have a 
fundamental flaw in the design. 11 Its two key 
parts- achieving strong economic growth on 
the basis of market reforms and strengthening 
the executive "vertical" around the beefed-up 
"power structures"- could prove to be incom-
patible." Markets normally react positively 
to stability but their sustained expansion re-
quires deregulation and decentralization. An 
indirect proof to this somewhat "theoretical" 
argument is that by the end of 2001 the 
economic growth in Russia had visibly slowed 
down, while many splits and divisions inside 
the executive had become apparent. While 
many observers are still worried about the 
growth of authoritarian trends in Putin's re-
gime, 1l the most grave risk is not that he will 
build a rigid vertically-integrated "police" 
state but that he will fail in this undertaking. 
It has already become evident that the aim 
of strengthening the state has evolved into a 
much narrower goal of consolidating the re-
gime, and Putin (starting as a quintessential 
gosudarstvennik) has become a hostage to his 
high ratings to a much greater degree than 
Clinton ever was. 14 The policy-making has 
evolved into a permanent campaigning, as if 
the elections are always a few months ahead. 
That narrows significantly his space for man-
oeuvring and the very ability to undertake 
serious (and inevitably painful) reforms; while 
Putin faces the need to advance simultane-
ously massive restructuring in the social sector 
(the pension fund and the communal 
housing), finances (the tax system), natural 
monopolies (RAO EEC is the first in line and 
GAZPROM the close second), judiciary (the 
court system) and the military, his main focus 
has already been set on securing the re-
election in spring 2004. With the emphasis 
on PR "technologies", simulation of activity 
and apparatus intrigue, he may well succeed 
in that, but the larger results could be not 
just disappointing but destabilizing. 15 Instant 
success may backfire through accumulation 
of a critical mass of neglected failures. 
Dominating so powerfully over Russia's 
politics, Putin quite possibly will exhaust the 
expectations, credits and inertia by the end 
of this decade- much the same way as Yeltsin 
had exhausted the reserves of his system of 
control by the late 1990s. 16 One significant 
corrosive impact here is again Chechnya. 
Keeping this crisis low profile, hoth domes-
tically and internationally, Putin can hardly 
deceive himself about its real costs and pains. 
Unlike Yeltsin, he does not have political sto-
mach to accept defeat or even a compromise; 
at the same time, the deadlock may well prove 
unsustainable. That leaves him with the op-
tion of military victory, which would require 
a significant escalation of hostilities from the 
current level of slow-moving atrocities. 17 The 
resonance of this Stalinist victory (entirely 
feasible if deadly force is applied consistent-
ly)" may, however, turn out to be much more 
destructive than that of the US victory in Afg-
hanistan (providing it does not turn into a 
failure) and more expensive than is budgeted 
for by the General Staff. 
Putin's successor will, therefore, inherit the 
results of a failed state-rebuilding project; a 
third president would have to accept that the 
means of public mobilization around a new 
"strong Russia" project are non-existent and 
the levers of administrative control - quite 
unreliable. Much the same way as Gorbachev 
was in late perestroika, 19 he may already in 
the succession phase be betrayed by the state 
apparatus (particularly the "power struc-
tures"), which could defect to other "power 
centres';. This bureaucratic "chain reaction" 
of centrifugal drift could easily go along re-
gional lines. Overall, the end result of Putin's 
statist project could hardly be a reinvigorated 
and self-assured Russia able to project po-
wer (least of all westwards, so the Baltic sta-
tes are in fact quite safe), but very possibly a 
dysfunctional state and divided society with 
massive conflict potential, multiple fault li-
nes and too many detonators. 
Parameters of Disaster 
Approaching the 1 OO'h anniversary of the Bol-
shevik revolution, Russia in many ways might 
look surprisingly similar to the huge mis-
shaped and overworked state that collapsed 
in autumn 1917. The main cause of a new 
implosion may again be a structural economic 
crisis, this time caused not by a crippling war 
mobilization but by inconsistent and badly 
mismanaged reforms, which create an unvia-
ble hybrid system. Over the next 15 years 
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Russia may experience several short periods 
of sharp growth (involving mostly export-
oriented energy and primary commodities 
sectors), interspersed by longer periods of 
depression that would produce an overall 
picture of prolonged stagnation (in fact, 
continuing since the late 1980s).20 A key fea-
ture of this pattern of "muddle-down" is sus-
tained under-investment in basic assets, 
caused by their low attractiveness for foreign 
investors and unstoppable capital flight. 21 
This paper cannot aim at presenting an ela-
borate macro-economic forecast, what is re-
levant for its topic is the trend of fragment-
ation of Russia's economic space. A few is-
lands of export-oriented industries (for in-
stance, the aluminium production) are becom-
ing disconnected from the rest of the economy, 
where regional-size markets are dominated 
by protected local producers, while Moscow 
stands apart as an area of arrogant affluence.22 
Oil and gas industries, controlled by a few 
giant companies, keep investing primarily in 
their own export capacity, while many ele-
ments of basic infrastructure - such as elec-
tricity grids - deteriorate beyond repair. 23 
Transport networks (including railways) 
could no longer support cost-efficient econo-
mic interactions; in terms of distance "resis-
tance", Russia is not just becoming even larger 
than it really is, it is becoming impenetrable, 
and the area, which is becoming virtually dis-
connected as well as derelict, is the Far East. 24 
Another important dimension of the 
multiple crises that might escalate between 
2010 and 2015 is demographic. Russian media 
is currently full of dramatic projections that 
present the sustained population decline and 
disturbing health statistics as a "looming 
humanitarian catastrophe".25 More sober an-
alyses show that migration from other post-
Soviet states remains a significant reserve 
against depopulation (except for some areas in 
the Far North), while life expectancy- despite 
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appalling health care - tends to increase." 
What is relevant here, is that with the arrival 
at the labour market of a new (and numerical-
ly smaller) generation born after the USSR, 
the overall geographic mobility would remain 
low, making links even between neighbour 
communities fragile. In parallel with this 
societal fragmentation, the reserves of tole-
rance and endurance in the society are run-
ning thin, much the same way as most of the 
basic assets and infrastructure built on tech-
nologies of the 1960-70s are coming to the 
end of their "life cycles" .27 Soviet (and more 
ancient) traditions of obedience and hard 
work are being replaced not by democratic 
values and entrepreneurial drive but by cyni-
cism, passivity and corruption. Putin may be 
able to tap into the nostalgic longing for "or-
der" and residual trust in a "good tsar", bur 
this personification condemns his reign to 
inevitable bitter disappointment.28 As an ex-
tra corrosive, Chechnya gradually spreads the 
destructive culture of violence. The atomised 
and sick society is becoming ripe for a chain 
of conflicts. 
Yet another key parameter of the on-going 
transformation, which contains seeds of pos-
sible conflict, is regionalism. This trend was 
developing strongly if unevenly during the 
1990s,29 so Putin has started his presidency 
with a series of measures aimed at restoring 
the integrity of central control. He may have 
succeeded superficially in that but structurally 
the basic factors that drive the growth of 
regionalism remain in place; the regional 
elites continue to rely on well-established 
political structures and to build their own 
economic foundations of power. There is also 
a distinctive growth of regional identities 
caused by the fragmentation of economic 
space and low geographic mobility, and the 
respective elites eagerly cultivate this process.30 
One noticeable feature in this patchy picture 
is growing alienation of "provinces" from 
Ivloscow, both as the federal center and an 
arrogantly rich region. It is possible that 
Putin's plan for creating seven federal districts 
would not be that effective in curbing the 
republican quasi-independence. In some cases 
(first of all, in the North Caucasus) it could 
even create political structures for larger-scale 
regional separatism. 31 
Current developments that might most 
significantly determine the character and 
intensity of future conflicts involve the Armed 
Forces and other "power structures". While 
for the military the overall trend through the 
1990s was that of degradation, for most other 
"armed bureaucracies" (from the Ministry of 
Interior to the Tax Police) it was strengthen-
ing and diversification. The second Chechen 
War, which was so instrumental in propell-
ing Putin to the summit of power, has proved 
beyond doubt the urgent need in reforming 
the Armed Forces - but has also massively 
complicated this process.32 Even placing his 
most trusted "lieutenant" Sergei lvanov in 
charge of the Defense Ministry, Putin cannot 
guarantee the successful advancement of 
reforms which remain under-financed and 
seriously affected by the pressure of the war.33 
While the economic realities dictate further 
numerical reductions of the Armed Forces, 
they may go through several phases of con-
traction and expansion in the next 10-15 years 
(oscillating on the basic level of 1,000,000), 
since local wars remain manpower-intensive 
endeavours. 34 
Modernization, in the mean,vhile, remains 
the most problematic part of the current and 
any future Armed Forces reform project; 
several crucial elements of military infra-
structure will, quite possibly, deteriorate 
beyond the level of acceptable risk (for Russia's 
neighbours this level might be significantly 
lower than for the authorities in Moscow). 
While the system of control of the strategic 
missile forces will, perhaps, be kept functional 
by targeted investments, some other elements 
of strategic deterrent (like early warning) may 
essentially disintegrate. Such logistically vul-
nerable branches of the Armed Forces as the 
Long-Range Aviation or the "blue-water" 
Navy could loose most of their combat effec-
tiveness and retain only symbolic roles as nuc-
lear "assets";35 at the same time, plenty of 
Army hardware (such as armour and artillery) 
may prove to be remarkably durable. In ge-
neral, the military structures will continue to 
generate high risks of technological accidents 
and even catastrophes, which could trigger 
serious political conflicts. 36 
With all the best intentions about "profes-
sionalization", the Armed Forces, as well as 
several other "power structures", would most 
probably remain dependent on the draft- and 
that will have significant societal conse-
quences. One is that a large proportion of 
young and middle-age men will have basic 
military training, and perhaps up to 
2,500,000 veterans (including a large majo-
rity of officers in the Army) could have first-
hand combat experience. Another is that the 
Armed Forces will not be able to improve 
the internal cohesion and remain prone to 
spontaneous loss of control. 37 Yet another is 
that the pattern of locally conducted draft 
would reinforce the trend towards regional-
ization of the Army. 
This trend fits naturally into the general 
picture of "Russia of the regions" character-
ized by the fragmentation of economic space, 
deterioration of transport infrastructure and 
consolidation of decentralised political 
frameworks. A key factor here is the interests 
of regional elites in "domestication" and even 
"privatization" of military units based in their 
respective domains. 38 For the military, reli-
ance on local sources of supply could become 
the only possible survival strategy, which also 
provides them with an opportunity to acquire 
a profile of a usable and useful instrument in 
IFS Info 3/02 9 
regional politics. From that perspective, 
Putin's master-plan to integrate the systems 
of control over the military and other "po-
wer structures" in the seven federal districts 
does not look promising (even leaving aside 
the lack of compatibility between various 
"power districts"), since pure administrative 
sub-ordination cannot compensate for the 
"indigenization" which comes natural for the 
special units under the Ministry of Interior 
(OMON and SOBR) and, in cases where state 
borders are subject to trans-regional inter-
actions, the forces of the Border Service." 
Overall, the most serious risks of internal 
conflict in Russia appear to come not from a 
deep ideological divide (like the "reds" against 
the "whites") or from a violent clash for po-
wer in the center (Putin would most probably 
be able to orchestrate a smooth transition of po-
we~ applying sophisticated "political techno· 
logics"), but from instabilities in far-away pro-
vinces. Regional authorities gradually acquire 
significant "power instruments" and would 
perhaps be more inclined to use them against 
one another than against the federal center. 
The latter could find itself with limited capa-
bilities to suppress or control local civil wars. 
Troubles "Taus Azimuts" 
Geography might be a crucial factor in 
determining the scale and intensity of, as well 
as spill-over from, various possible regional 
conflicts. It is not the distance from Moscow 
as such that is the key independent geographic 
variable; it is rather the density of transport 
networks (Murmansk ob last is in fact as dif-
ficult to reach as Primorye, and Kaliningrad 
is not much easier to keep under control than 
Sakhalin). It is also foreseeable that the federal 
authorities could be reluctant to deploy to 
10 IFS Info 3/02 
distant locations a division from the mighty 
Moscow Military District, since their key task 
is to secure stability in the center. This certain-
ly cannot preclude attempts at using military 
force in political battles inside the Garden 
Ring (a highway encircling downtown 
Moscow), but overall it is quite possible that 
Moscow, with its relatively high level of 
prosperity and plentiful levers of control, 
would remain stable and reasonably peaceful, 
shielding itself from regional troubles.40 An-
other important geographic feature of the 
future conflicts is their predisposition to 
spread cross-border or interplay with possible 
instabilities in neighbour-states. 
Power-play in the South 
Russia is and will continue to be exposed to 
much violent instability in the areas to the 
south of its borders; at the moment of this 
writing, the epicentre of turbulence in Afg-
hanistan appears to be under US control but 
the situation will continue to remain fluid for 
months if not years to come. It could be point-
ed out that Putin shifted strategic attention 
to Central Asia well in advance of the US 
retaliatory campaign, perhaps drawing some 
lessons from the history of the Great Game.41 
The crushing defeat of the Taliban may well 
play into Russia's hands as far as the aim of 
consolidating its positions in the region is 
concerned.42 However, already in the mid-
term the fundamental issue of inadequacy of 
available instruments and resources for a pro-
active strategy of a "security guarantor" will 
inevitable strike back. 43 Conducting a stra-
tegic withdrawal from Central Asia, which 
might start with a retreat from the Tajik-Afg-
han border, Russia would probably be able 
to limit the violent spill-over inside its fron-
tier regions. The vast steppes of Kazakhstan 
make a natural "buffer"; feeling safe behind 
it, Moscow may even decide to take advant-
age of the possible collapse of this poorly 
stitched-together state, taking sides with the 
Russians in the North and North-East in or-
der to seize control over the oil-rich Caspian 
littoral in the West. But with all the potential 
cataclysms in the Caspian area, the area where 
Russia could directly encounter most grave 
and penetrating security challenges is the 
Caucasus. 
Complete devastation of Chechnya might 
lead to a broad destabilization of the whole 
Northern Caucasus. Facing this violent neigh-
bourhood, the Stavropol and Krasnodar kray 
may form a tight strategic alliance, backed 
by the Rosrov, Volgograd and Astrakhan 
oblast. The newly-created structures of the 
Southern administrative district may be used 
for consolidating this security-driven "Alliance 
of 5 regions" and turning it into a reasonably 
unified political unit, able not just to bargain 
with Moscow but also to make its own policy. 
Instead of "privatizing" the military assets 
of the North Caucasus Military District, 
mem-bers of the "Alliance" might be able to 
keep most of them under unified control, and 
that will give it a military force of up to 
100,000 troops, backed by para-military 
Cossack formations. 
The basic strategic aim of the Southern 
Alliance may be to fortify and protect the 
southern borders of Russia "proper", which 
may be justified through aggressive 
nationalistic ideology that would assert the 
need to protect the "real Russians against the 
"Caucasians". Effectively cutting out Kalmykia 
and Dagestan, the alliance may also build a 
military-political partnership with North 
Ossetia, which would serve as a bridgehead 
vis-a-vis the unruly mountaineers and a bridge 
towards the Southern Caucasus. Krasnodar 
kray, while swallowing Adygeya, may also 
provide military assistance to Abkhazia, seek-
ing to keep Georgia weak and divided." In 
case of a major turmoil in Ukraine, the alliance 
may send "volunteers" across the Kerch Straight 
into the Crimea which may become yet an-
other quasi-state with significant military 
assets but ruined economy. 
The southern Russian regions, controlling 
the major oil pipeline Tengiz-Novorossiisk, 
as well as the oil terminal in this port, and, 
possibly, the gas pipeline to Turkey, may deve-
lop taste for playing in the "Great Game" 
around the Caspian Sea, and their reach might 
extend as far as undercutting the Baku-Cheyhan 
pipeline. Even if Georgia and Azerbaijan would 
be able to forge a counter-alliance with some 
quasi-states of the Northern Caucasus and 
secure some support from Turkey, their defense 
capacity would hardly be a match to the po-
wer projection capabilities of the alliance. 
The whole Caucasian region would then 
become a theatre for a range of overlapping 
low-intensity conflicts, fought mostly by irre-
gulars but contained and controlled from the 
North by a hardened military structure. This 
"army-without-a-state" could be sustained only 
if the five Russian regions maintain a reason-
ably high degree of unity and obtain extra re-
sources from energy exports. While most of 
the heavy weapons and other hardware avail-
able for these forces would be seriously ob-
solete (by NATO standards), and the organi-
zation could resemble more the Soviet Army 
than a modern Combined Joint Task Force 
(CJTF), the alliance could be able to dominate 
militarily its immediate neighbourhood. 
Meltdown and Mutiny in the North 
The Kola Peninsula remains one of the most 
militarized areas in the world- and certainly 
the one with the heaviest concentration of 
nuclear weapons, reactors and materiel. Du-
ring the 1990s, the geo-strategic profile of 
Russia's North-West changed significantly: on 
the one hand, the Northern Fleet preserved 
its strategic role and may even strengthen it 
if the plans to concentrate all SSBNs here 
would indeed be implemented during this 
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decade.45 On the other hand, the Leningrad 
Military District (MD) is no longer perceived 
as a "frontline" district and this perception 
of very low external threat would probably 
con-tinue, even if Finland and the Baltic "trio" 
would join NATO. As a result, most Army units 
in this district were either disbanded or re-
duced to low readiness status (skeleton units); 
the only full-strength unit is the 76•h Pskov 
Airborne Division, located some 1300 km 
south of Murmansk. 
This corresponds to the relatively high level 
of internal stability in this vast region 
(currently known as the "presidential re-
gion"),'' but at the same time increases the 
specific risks related to the nuclear-strategic 
"overload" of the Kola Peninsula. Indeed, the 
probability of violent social unrest in the 
North-Western Russia is reasonably low: 
Karelia is increasingly involved in cooperative 
ties with Finland; while the coal-producing 
Pechora and Vorkura will continue to loose 
population, there might also emerge new 
economic dynamism related to the develop-
ment of hydro-carbons in the Barents Sea. 
But as for the Northern Fleet, despite all its 
strategic importance, during the 1990s it was 
left to deteriorate to a level involving serious 
risks of major accidents. It is not just that the 
combat ships are dismally maintained (the 
proper logistics for major surface combatants 
in fact never existed), it is also that the whole 
logistic support infrastructure is now on the 
brink of collapse." In this situation, some 
poorly sustained efforts to increase finan-
cing" or to finish the construction of a few 
new combat ships·" cannot reverse the trend 
towards disintegration of the Navy. At the 
same time, the requirements of a 'grand 
strategy' 50 and the prestige considerations 
would continue to push the Northern Fleet 
towards keeping several nuclear submarines 
and major surface combatants in its combat 
order, even if not combat ready. 
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One consequence of this sustained inability 
to finance and support the complex structures 
of the Navy is a permanently high risk of 
technological disasters. While it is the poorly 
maintained combat systems that are the most 
prone to accidents/' the most grave risks will 
come from the damage inflicted by these acci-
dents to nuclear weapons and reactors, as well 
as the accidental destruction of dozens of re-
tired nuclear reactors that will continue to 
be stored in the close vicinity of the naval 
bases without proper attention.52 Another 
consequence is that the under-financed, under-
staffed and poorly trained Navy inevitably 
becomes prone not just to all sorts of "human 
errors" (which often aggravate technological 
disasters), but also to erosion of discipline, 
gross insubordination, and even mutiny. 
The Russian Navy has a rich history of 
mutinies in the early 20•h century, involving 
both battleships (Potemkin, Ochakov, Pamyat 
Azova) and naval bases (Sveaborg, Kron-
shtadt), caused primarily by deteriorating 
social conditions and humiliating defeat in 
the war with japan. This time a mutiny might 
be triggered by a technological accident lea-
ding to panic and loss of control. 53 The 
mutiny might quickly spread through several 
naval bases; while the marine brigade of the 
Northern Fleet might remain reluctant to act 
against the rebellious garrisons, the command 
of the Leningrad MD would find it extremely 
difficult to find reliable combat-ready units 
and to transport them to Murmansk along 
the only railway link that can easily be 
blocked or destroyed. Lacking any organiza-
tion or ideology, the mutineers can hardly keep 
any resemblance of order, some may attempt 
to escape to Norway, but some hard-core 
groups, seizing control over a few nuclear 
weapons, can blackmail Moscow and pre-
sent a broad range of demands, from ransom 
to resignation of the president. 
Chaos in the East 
The vast and sparsely populated Russian Far 
East contains half a dozen loosely connected 
regions, which have plenty of common ills 
but very low sense of unity or common 
interests. Each region struggles with such 
problems as industrial decline, urban degra-
dation and depopulation on its own, trying 
to get attention from Moscow (increasingly 
complicated by the geo-economic drift, 
caused by ageing transport infrastructure) and 
seeking to attract foreign investors by their 
natural resources. From the point of view of 
potential violent conflicts, the three weakest 
links are Kamchatka, Sakhalin and Primorye. 
Kamchatka, as a heavily militarized region, 
faces many of the same problems of collapsing 
naval infrastructure as the Murmansk oblast, 
but is even more vulnerable from the point 
of view of energy supply and does not have 
such neighbours as Finland and Norway to 
keep a watchful eye on its troubles. Even if 
by 2010-2015 all strategic submarines are 
redeployed from the Pacific to the Northern 
Fleet, the region cannot be completely de-
nuclearised - but might become even more 
neglected.54 A mutiny, therefore, could speci-
fically target nuclear facilities in order to get 
a security guarantee against possible force-
ful action directed from Moscow and to 
receive instant international attention. While 
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky (where about a 
half of the region's population is concen-
trated) could be engulfed by the mutiny, 
perhaps triggered by a disastrous accident and 
possibly instigated by regional elites (who 
might entertain an idea like "free Kamchatka") 
the northern part of the region (Koryaksky 
okrug) may try to split (as it attempted to do 
in 1991) and politically distance itself from 
the conflict. 
Sakhalin is much less militarised but is 
currently perceived by experts as one of those 
regions where high level of economic prob-
!ems translates into high level of social tens-
ion." At the same time, the island has con-
siderable resources of oil and gas and its go-
vernment has, after long delays, started to 
build stable relations with foreign investors, 
first of all from Japan and South Korea. It is 
hard to expect that energy projects would 
generate a spectacular economic boom, but 
Sakhalin, with its crumbling urban infra-
structure, might get irritated that most of the 
income is "confiscated" by Moscow. This per-
ceived injustice and "exploitation" might lead 
to the growth of secessionist tendencies, 
fuelled by expectations of more "oil money" 
but complicated by increasing migration from 
Korea. Seeking to secure international sup-
port for its independence, Sakhalin might 
offer Japan to strike a separate deal on the 
four contested Kuril islands (which formally 
belong to Kamchatka oblast but are much 
closer to, and economically more connected 
with Sakahlin). 
Primorsky kray, with its relatively dense 
population (perhaps, around 2,000,000 by 
2015), significant militarization and serious 
energy supply problems, has been also distin-
guished since mid-1990s by high level of 
political tensions, both internal and vis-a-vis 
Moscow. These tensions are likely to continue 
since the prospects of rapid economic develop-
ment stimulated by opening of the "Eastern 
gate" into Russia will hardly materialize.56 
In this permanently tense situation, a political 
grouping might try to mobilize public sup-
port around the idea of recreating the Far 
Eastern Republic (which existed briefly in the 
early 1920s). It could be combined with ethno-
nationalistic slogans aimed primarily against 
the illegal Chinese immigration, which might 
reach such a scale that Russian border regions 
can feel the threat of being overwhelmed.57 
If the political conflicts in the region turn 
violent with some of this violence targeting 
Chinese communities, China might feel ob-
IFS Info 3/02 13 
liged to intervene, or jump at an opportunity 
to combine limited steps aimed at protecting 
its citizens with more forceful measures aimed 
at resolving the border disputes." 
Neighbours-in-Need in the West 
While Russia's western regions appear rela-
tively stable and are not expected to generate 
violent conflicts between them or with Mos-
cow, they can be strongly affected by possible 
destabilization of Belarus and Ukraine. These 
rwo countries for most of the 1990s followed 
remarkably different trajectories: Belarus op-
ted for self-isolation and re-unification with 
Russia, while the Ukraine sought to cultivate 
ties with the West; currently, however, both 
show potential for serious internal conflicts, 
which may remain latent and escalate sudden-
ly due to some external trigger. In both cases 
Russia might find it impossible not to inter-
vene, but the aims would inevitably be mud-
dled by the overlapping agendas of regional 
interests, nationalistic aspirations, restoration 
of order and relations with the West. 
In Belarus the main line of the conflict could 
be that of implosion of a corrupt semi-
authoritarian regime. While the opposition 
groupings could rely on support from Pol-
and and Lithuania (by that time also a NATO 
member), Moscow might find itself commit-
ted to propping up the regime in Minsk.59 
Deploying troops (for instance, with the man-
date to seal off Belarus' western and northern 
borders) and police forces (for instance, for 
riot control in Minsk), Russian government 
could face not only sharp criticism from, and 
certain counter-actions by the West, but also 
resistance from its own regions, which might 
engage into cross-border interactions with key 
centers in eastern Belarus, strengthening their 
hand against Minsk. 60 Another dimension of 
this crisis might involve Kaliningrad: this 
isolated region might find in this turbulence 
an opportunity to secede from Russia, parti-
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cularly since its economy would be entirely 
re-oriented towards the EU and its military 
profile reduced to insignificant features. 
In Ukraine, growing frustration with the 
results of a pro-Western course paves the way 
for a rapprochement with Russia which, in 
turn, radicalizes political opposition." A po-
tential crisis at any moment between 2005 
and 2015 might take a complex and multi-
dimensional character: a violent political con-
frontation in Kiev, strikes and mass protests 
in Kharkov and Donbass, an opportunistic 
break-away drive in the Crimea, and a Europe-
oriented nationalistic uprising in Western 
Ukraine. There is no way that Moscow can 
take control over the whole of Ukraine or 
effectively dominate all of these conflicts. 
Most probably, it will focus its efforts on Kiev, 
seeking to ensure the victory for a pro-Russian 
party in the capital and then to help it to re-
store control over most of the state. At the 
same time, southern Russian regions may 
undertake their own interventions, advancing 
a creeping annexation of Eastern Ukraine or, 
as described above, supporting the Crimean 
secessionism. Perhaps the most complicated 
twist of this conflict may develop in Western 
Ukraine, which might find its European aspi-
rations enmeshed into particular interests of 
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania 
(which by 2015 would probably all be NATO 
members). This area would generally remain 
outside Russia's reach, but it could make a 
serious impact from its southern flank, where 
the conflict in Transdniestria may re-ignite 
(even if the Russian troops are by that time 
withdrawn)." 
To summarise, it appears quite possible that 
violent conflicts of different format and 
intensity, with various resonance and spill-
over, could escalate, perhaps even simultane-
ously, in peripheral Russia's regions and in 
its immediate neighbourhood. In each case, 
Moscow's limited ability to project power and 
restore order would raise demands and create 
imperatives for the Western powers, and first 
of all for the US, to intervene militarily. 
Battlefield Environment: 
Unsuitable and Unfriendly 
Field Marshal Montgomery allegedly placed 
the proposition to invade Russia at the very 
top of the list of military blunders, to be 
avoided at any costs.63 This post-WWII con-
ventional wisdom may remain true for years 
to come, however, the above-described con-
flicts could produce a number of situations 
where non-intervention would become an 
equally serious blunder. It goes without saying 
that NATO is perfectly capable of committing 
such a blunder; in fact, every situation where 
an intervention inside Russia becomes a mat-
ter of practical discussions is nearly certain 
to generate sharp disagreements and agoni-
zing doubts. Back in mid-2001, the options 
described below would have seemed to be 
entirely hypothetical; however, the chain of 
events after 11 September necessitates a dif-
ferent perspective. While it is true that NATO, 
even evoking for the first time the central 
Article V of its Charter, has had little if any 
relevance for the US-led global anti-terrorist 
war," the Alliance now has to look seriously 
into its possible functions in the next 'un-
expected' crisis, if it wants to prevent further 
slide towards complete irrelevance. Typically, 
in such situations time and space would be 
available in proportions strictly opposite to 
the desires of operation planners (i.e. too little 
of the former and too much of the latter); 
capabilities and intentions of the adversaries 
could be unclear, but some other parameters 
of the potential peacekeeping grounds/ 
battlefields may be outlined with reasonable 
certainty. 
It is sufficiently clear that a US/NATO inter-
vention with the goal of protecting Poland 
or any other Eastern European country (in-
cluding the three Baltic states) against Russian 
invasion would hardly ever become a matter 
of practical consideration;" Russia would al-
ways find its limited capabilities stretched way 
too thin to challenge NATO in such a direct way. 
Much more probable are urgent requests from 
concerned neighbours, international NGOs, 
local authorities, and in some cases even from 
the Russian government, to perform an inter-
vention into some kind of a civil war, most 
probably of regional scale. There might be 
multiple parties to such conflicts with diffe-
rent attitudes towards the intervening forces; 
the violence, termination of which would be 
the immediate aim of an intervention, would 
mostly be unstructured and chaotic. While 
small arms would be widespread, in many 
cases the warring parties would be able to 
use also armour and artillery, and in some 
cases even tactical aviation on a limited scale. 
There will be practically no modern weapon 
systems and very few of those build on 
technologies of the 1990s; the Command-
Control-Communication-Intelligence (C3I) 
systems available to the "enemy" would be 
very primitive and unreliable, but there could 
be instances where skilled use of sophisticated 
computer technology could damage the in-
formation systems of allied forces. 
One key question will inevitably be about 
the "enemy". In the environment of internal 
unrest it is never easy to distinguish between 
friend-and-foe, and there would not neces-
sarily be ethnic, linguistic or cultural features 
to help with this identification. Overall, the 
population of the target area would be rela-
tively high educated (albeit, with poor ave-
rage knowledge of foreign languages), pre-
dominantly urban, accustomed to all sorts of 
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hardship and possessing skills in exploiting 
dilapidated equipment that most Western 
users would consider as scrap. The prevailing 
cultural patterns as well as the demographic 
structure of the population make it highly 
improbable that child soldiers might consti-
tute a considerable portion of fighters. On 
the other hand, a high proportion of men 
would have basic military training and even 
combat experience. Some groups may be 
highly motivated to fight against "foreign 
invaders" and may continue resistance against 
heavy odds. 
One of the major problems on the potential 
theatres would be mobility. It is not the terrain 
as such that constitutes the problem (no 
jungles, high mountains or deserts), but rather 
the need to cover large distances from the 
"point of entry" with poor transport and com-
munication networks. The "enemy" would 
have the advantage of familiarity with the 
terrain and could specifically target lines of 
communications, for instance \Vith intensive 
use of land mines. Local sources of supply 
might be pretty limited, even the quality of 
drinking water could be significantly sub-
standard. While chemical and biological 
weapons would most probably not be used 
(however, such use cannot be completely ruled 
out), in many cases the destruction of 
industrial facilities may result in dangerous 
pollution. Nuclear weapons and materials 
may be present in many potential conflicts, 
and in some they would constitute the most 
threatening dimension. 
South: Confronting the Southern Alliance 
While NATO could hardly be involved in 
hostilities in Central Asia, and even the US 
might find that theatre prohibitively demand-
ing for sustained operations, an intervention 
in the Caucasus - in response to Georgia's 
plea for help or aimed at securing the Baku-
Cheyhan pipeline -may be requested. Turkey 
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would be an indispensable partner in con-
ducting this intervention, providing both the 
ports for US/NATO naval deployment and 
the land access to the theatre. 
While designed basically as a peacekeeping 
operation with limited enforcement capa-
bilities, it would also be one that may face a 
relatively well-organized "enemy" represented 
by the alliance of five of Russia's southern 
regions. Besides possessing a regular army, 
this alliance may sponsor a range of para-
military formations and would with few 
doubts resort to terrorism. A confrontation 
with this "enemy" might require rapid rein-
forcement of the initially deployed force and 
re-orientation of the whole operation. 
A major advantage of the intervening 
coalition would be the possibility to project 
power from sea to shore with few impedi-
ments, since Russia's Black Sea Fleet would 
not be able to put up much opposition 
(whether controlled by Moscow or "priva-
tized" by the Alliance); the deployment of an 
aircraft carrier group is therefore highly 
advantageous. The most vulnerable target for 
blockade is Novorossiisk, since the "enemy" 
would be highly dependent on oil exports 
from this port. However, any deployment of 
troops inside the Caucasus (for instance, 
along the pipeline) would expose them to risks 
of partizan warfare. It would also be essential 
to prevent any undesirable spill-over from the 
intervention, for instance, an attempt by 
Azerbaijan (possibly helped by Turkey) to win 
back Nagorno Karabakh. 
North: Securing Nuclear Assets 
An intervention might become necessary for 
denying the mutinous Northern Fleet the con-
trol of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. 
Since the conflict might erupt with little-or-no 
warning and rapidly escalate, time would be 
of high value, while information can be scarce 
and sketchy. The possibility to use northern 
Norwegian ports is sine qua non for any inter-
vention. 
Since the "enemy" would most probably be 
unable to organize any serious resistance, the 
intervention could be of small-to-medium size 
and involve several special operations aimed 
at securing nuclear weapons at the 3-4 main 
naval bases and the deployment of some 
3,000 troops to Severomorsk (a city of 50,000 
population with perhaps up to 1,000 rebel 
forces) with the mandate to restore order. For 
the first phase of the operation, surprise may 
be the key factor, but for the second non-
combat phase the arrival of sufficient person-
nel trained for handling nuclear material is 
cruciaL Technical solutions and engineering 
work might prove to be much more compli-
cated than restoring order, particularly since 
most of the Fleet's nuclear weapons will be 
kept well beyond the warrant period. Regio-
nal authorities in Murmansk, certainly shaken 
by the rebellion, could be cooperative and, 
perhaps, more cooperative than Moscow, 
which could grant the permission for inter-
vention only reluctantly. 
East: Pre-empting China 
The chaotic crisis in Russia's Far East could 
necessitate several interventions with diffe-
rent aims and formats. The response to a 
naval mutiny in Kamchatka could be similar 
to the operation in the Kola Peninsula, 
securing nuclear weapons being its prime 
goaL The scale of the operation may be even 
smaller (the only place to take control of 
would be Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, a city 
of perhaps 150,000 inhabitants), and the main 
logistical difficulty would be the lack of any 
port facilities in the vicinity. 
If the secessionist drive in Sakhalin would 
turn violent, the role of key peace-maker 
could be left to Japan, perhaps in cooperation 
with Canada and Australia. But a violent 
unrest in Primorsky kray might require a 
large-scale and high-risk intervention due to 
at least two factors: one is again the control 
over nuclear weapons belonging to the Pacific 
Fleet, another is the possibility of Chinese 
intervention under the pretext of saving the 
lives of its citizens. 
While it may be short to impossible to pre-
vent China from advancing towards Khaba-
rovsk and Blagoveshensk, taking control over 
Vladivostok and the area around it up to the 
border with Korea is generally feasible. Such 
an operation might involve a rapid deploy-
ment (perhaps, up to a Marine division), which 
will then have to be expanded and sustained; 
that would require building a considerable 
coalition force (involving Australia, Canada, 
Japan, and South Korea, with the US provid-
ing the core of the expedition force). The goals 
of territorial control could be consistently 
achieved only if cooperation from local 
authorities is secured, for which the political 
framework of the Far Eastern Republic may 
prove usefuL 
West: Reducing Instability 
Potential crises in Belarus and Ukraine 
(especially if developing simultaneously) 
could create instability of such a scale that 
no Western intervention could realistically 
aim at restoring a stable order; the goals could 
be rather to stabilize the areas adjacent to 
the four East European and the three Baltic 
states, while preventing these states (all of 
them NATO members at the time) from 
acting unilaterally on some nationalistic 
agendas. 
In the case of Belarus, a key consideration 
would be to avoid direct confrontation with 
Russia, \Vho-actingonsome "union" commit-
ments - might try to prop up an unpopular 
regime in Minsk. Brest and Grodno could be 
the initial targets of an intervention, designed 
in a peacekeeping format; the situation in 
Kaliningrad should be closely monitored in 
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order to prevent any violent unrest in this 
isolated enclave. A possible serious compli-
cation requiring some special operations 
would be the deployment of Russian nuclear 
weapons in Belarus and Kaliningrad prior to 
the crisis, which may be ordered in "response" 
to NATO enlargement." 
In the case of Ukraine, the main area of con-
cern would probably be the Trans-Carpathya, 
as well as Lviv, lvano-Frankivsk and Cher-
novtsy regions. Complicated history, uncer-
tain relations with neighbours and ethnic 
patchwork make this area potentially volatile 
and difficult to pacify, with some groupings 
enthusiastically welcoming an intervention 
and others- violently opposing it. Romania 
should be discouraged from acting unilateral-
ly vis-a-vis Moldova, and Turkey- in Crimea, 
where a secessionist conflict might require a 
US-led multilateral intervention of several 
Black Sea states. 
Conclusions 
This paper deliberately avoids the fundamen-
tal issue of whether the West in general and 
NATO in particular would be politically 
willing to perform any of the described 
interventions. Neither does it discuss the 
crucial issue of NATO-Russia relations, 
which could hardly have much impact on 
regional developments inside Russia but 
might significantly influence the attitude of 
the central Russian government towards the 
spectre of foreign intervention. The scenario 
of a full-scale confrontation between NATO 
and Russia is left outside the scope of this 
paper not only due to its high complexity 
(would require much extra space and addi-
tional research) but also because of the 
assumption that Moscow would do every-
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thing possible to avoid such a confrontation. 
Facing the threat of losing control over parts 
of the periphery, the Russian government, 
most probably, would be reluctant to ask for 
a NATO intervention but quite possibly 
would stop short of opposing one. That 
creates a "grey area" of potential crises where 
some Russian military units are turning their 
arms against Hinvaders", while other remain 
'neutral' or even turn supportive. 
It is exactly this "grey area" that is targeted 
by the above analysis, while all the compli-
cated foreign policy intrigues are left to a se-
parate investigation.'? The only observation 
in this regard is that the US under no circum-
stances would be able to conduct them 
unilaterally and would find itself seriously 
dependent on the support of key allies. Even 
if NATO mechanisms would prove unsuitable 
or inefficient," the very possibility of con-
structing an ad hoc "coalition of the willing" 
would depend upon expensive and sustained 
efforts of European states (whether in the 
framework of the European Security and 
Defence Policy or not) in building up their 
own power projection capabilities. 
Russia, despite its present-day semblance 
of stability, may see a chain of violent con-
flicts engulfing the most vulnerable parts of 
its vast periphery - and some of those may 
pose such risks to international peace and 
security that external interventions might 
seem the only solution. Neither the Gulf War, 
nor the air war against Yugoslavia offers a 
useful model for these interventions, but the 
KFOR deployment (with all its complications) 
can perhaps provide some lessons on taking 
control over a highly unstable area. These 
lessons could be compared with the historical· 
records of interventions in Murmansk/Ar-
khangelsk and in the Far East during the Civil 
War of 1918-1922; while highly contro-
versial, these experiences are definitely worth 
revisiting. In most cases, it would be not an 
organized military force equipped with old 
Soviet weaponry that would constitute the 
"enemy" for the intervening forces, but a pleth-
ora of para-military forces, spreading violent 
chaos. The operations, therefore, might not 
be that demanding regarding high-technology 
weapon systems, but could be manpower-
intensive, reqmnng the deployment of con-
siderable forces for many months. Securing 
control over nuclear weapons, building 
elementary safety systems for various nuclear 
facilities and dealing with nuclear contamina-
tion could be the most serious risks in con-
ducting the interventions. 
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